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pursues "prerevolutionary policies with the fanaticism and irresponsibility of
desperation" (p. 336). It follows that a Republican President, to be elected,
must identify himself with the outlook supported by a majority of the people,
and that after election he can expect the opposition of an important part of his
own party in Congress.
Mr. Morgenthau writes that a Republican President who thinks and acts in
terms of party discipline and looks at the Republican party as his own and the
Democratic party as the opposition completely misreads the lines which divide
both Congress and the people with regard to foreign policy. And a Republican
President who, like Mr. Eisenhower, conducts foreign policy with a view to
maintaining the unity of his own party can do so only at the price of his own
paralysis or of his own surrender. That paralysis and that surrender have been
the history of our foreign policy under his presidency.
If in fact the President and Mr. Dulles have had a rational foreign policy,
possibly their misunderstanding of the American system explains their inability
to carry it out. But any presumption that Dulles and Eisenhower have had a
rational foreign policy would be difficult to prove. The presumption that the
Democratic party is capable of carrying out a rational policy would be nearly as
difficult to prove. Nevertheless the dilemma of a hypothetical Republican President who had a rational foreign policy is brilliantly described. And Mr. Morgenthau's plea that the executive must fulfil the role in foreign affairs which our
Constitution assigns him, that he must show initiative and leadership, if we are
to have a public opinion capable of guiding and supporting rational foreign
policy would seem obviously true.
RiCHAm HOWARD POWERS*
* Associate Professor of History, Southern Methodist University.

The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws. By Pierre A. Lalive. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955. Pp. xix, 200. 30s. net.
The end of private international law is frequently said to be international
uniformity of decision. This end, of course, cannot be attained unless there is
international uniformity of private international law. It is well known how far
away we are from such uniformity. In the book under review, the author,
now a member of the faculty of law of the University of Geneva, Switzerland,
has chosen one of the few topics with respect to which the choice-of-law rule
appears to be the same throughout most of the world. The rule that problems
concerning the transfer of title to a particular chattel are to be determined in
accordance with the lex rei sitae has come to be adopted in nearly every
country. It looks as if the once dominating rule of mobilia sequntur personam
domini has been abandoned everywhere except in Spain, Puerto Rico, and
perhaps other countries where the Spanish Civil Code of 1888 is still in effect.
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In chapters 3, 4 and 5 of his book, Dr. Lalive describes how and why the old
rule was abandoned and the present uniformity achieved. In this lucid presentation he shows that the older rule was hardly ever applied without exceptions
in any country.
From this presentation one can derive a conclusion of significance for the
entire field of private international law. Judicial practice often finds itself confronted with a great variety of cases which superficially have one common
feature. Among these cases a particular group is of special frequency and
significance. A choice-of-law rule is developed which is well suited to take
care of this group. Theoretical writers seize upon it, christen it with an attractive name, and articulate it in the form of a maxim which is simple but also
too broad. It covers cases for which it is inappropriate, and when such cases
actually arise a counter-maxim is coined which, while it is well suited for the
new cases, does not fit the old ones. A controversy is carried on as to which
of the two maxims is the right one until at long last it is perceived that the
controversy is meaningless unless it is resolved by developing a distinction
which applies each rule to that group of cases for which it is appropriate.
The rule of mobilia sequntur personam domini was developed to take care
of transfers of a total collection of assets such as occurs uno actu upon the
death of the owner, in the case of bankruptcy or by virtue of marriage. It is
practical and conducive of legal certainty that in such cases the problems connected with the transfer are determined by one single law for all the assets
concerned, and as such law it is hardly practicable to choose any other than
the personal law of the owner. The situation is different, however, where some
particular chattel is sought to be transferred by such a transaction inter vivos
as a sale or a gift, or in the case of the alleged acquisition of title to some
particular chattel by way of occupation or prescription. In those cases the only
law that can be ascertained with certainty, and which is thus apt to enable
everyone concerned--quite particularly third parties such as prospective purchasers and creditors-to determine title, is that of the situs of the chattel
in question.
As to problems concerning title to single chattels as such, the rule of lex rei
sitae is demanded by the needs of commerce. Yet it took more than a century
for that rule to be transformed from an ill-defined and controversial exception
from the rule of lex personalisdomini into a fully recognized choice-of-law rule
of autonomous standing. As demonstrated by Dr. Lalive, this transformation
was first achieved in Germany-where the trail was blazed by Wachter's and
Savigny's careful inquiries into the interests at stake-while it is, or perhaps
only seems to be, lagging behind in the United States. In England the spell of
the old maxim was definitely broken by Cammel v. Sewell,' but cases expressly
concerned with the problem have been exceedingly rare. They have also been
11[1860] 5 H. & N. 728.
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infrequent in those three Civil Law countries whose laws are given the most
extensive treatment by Dr. Lalive, namely France, Germany, and Switzerland.
In the United States reported cases are not quite so rare, and neither are
they numerous save for a rash of recent cases dealing with automobile titles.
Dr. Lalive seeks to explain the paucity of decisions by the very uniformity of
the choice-of-law rule. Another reason may perhaps be found in the comparatively low value of the majority of chattels, a factor which may deter parties
from litigating or at least from bringing a case up to those courts for which
decisions are reported. Perhaps the practical significance of private international law is not quite so great as we, its priests, are inclined to believe. Trade
flourished even in those days in which the rule of lex rei sitae was not so fully
recognized, and it flourishes today in spite of the confusion still existing in
the law of contracts.
Even the uniformity of the rule of lex rei sitae may be more apparent than
real when we scrutinize its application in detail. Does the rule refer only to
the substantive law of the situs or to its total body of law including its private
international law? How is the domain of the rule of the lex rei sitae to be
demarcated from the domain of the contract which almost invariably accompanies the transfer of a chattel? Where is the exact borderline between problems concerning the passing of title to a universality of assets, and those
concerning the transfer of title to a single asset as such? What is a chattel?
When is it to be treated as an immovable? Where is its situs when it is "represented" by a bill of lading or some similar instrument? How is the rule of
lex rei sitae to be applied where a transfer requires a sequence of events of
which some occur in one jurisdiction and some in others? Shall a jurisdiction,
in order to protect the holder of a security title, modify its own internal law
of bona fide purchase when the chattel has been brought into the jurisdiction
without the consent of the holder of the security title? Shall exceptions from
the rule of lex rei sitae be made as to personal wearing apparel, or, more
important, as to res in transitu,or as to such peculiar chattels as ships, aircraft,
rolling stock, or automobiles?
Most of these questions are dealt with on a world-wide scale by Dr. Lalive.
His general approach is that of claiming the widest possible application for
the law of the place at which the chattel was physically located at the time
of the event which is alleged to have affected title to it. Generally this attitude
is unquestionably in tune with the practical needs of business. But at times
these needs may require distinctions even finer than those drawn by the author.
The line between problems of the law of contracts and problems of the law
of property can hardly be drawn without a detailed analysis of the rules of
substantive law of the several systems of national laws. While the line can be
drawn clearly in the German system in which the transfer of title is treated
as being independent of the underlying contract, it is blurred in French and
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Anglo-American law where the sale is treated as just one transaction containing both contractual and title elements. While even in these systems these two
elements can be separated from each other, an intricate analysis would seem
to be appropriate, especially as to cases of rescission or annulment. With respect
to German law on the other hand, these and similar problems cannot be handled
without reference to the way in which the party who loses his title by virtue
of the abstract nature of the transfer can find compensation by means of a
claim for unjust enrichment. Attention to this supplementation of the title rules
is all the more important in private international law as the limitation of the
rule of lex rei sitae to the title problem may easily result in the application of a
different law to the problem of compensation by way of a claim for enrichment
and thus to an incongruous result. It also seems that the variousi tendencies,
observable in Anglo-American and French law, of treating matters which are
unquestionably title problems as contract problems have their root in the
failure to recognize that the injustice which would follow from treating a life
situation as constituting solely a problem of title can and must be supplemented
by recognizing that it also contains a problem of unjust enrichment.
The fact that in private international law one cannot dispense with the
analysis of the substantive laws concerned is illustrated also by Dr. Lalive's
treatment of the alleged contrast between legal systems in which title is transferred by the mere agreement of the parties, as it is in French and AngloAmerican law, and those in which, as in German or Swiss law, tradition of
the chattel is required. If these latter laws are looked upon more closely, it
appears that tradition does not necessarily mean the physical transfer of possession, but that it also covers the so-called constitutum possessorium, the
brevi manu traditio and what is called in German Besitziiberweisung.In the
first case the chattel remains in the hands of the transferor, but it is agreed
between him and the transferee that the former shall hold it no longer as
owner but as bailee for the transferee. In the case of brevi manu traditio the
transferee holds the chattel as bailee for the transferor, who agrees that ,from
now on the transferee shall hold it as owner. In- the last case the chattel is
with a third person who holds it as the bailee of the transferor. Title passes
as soon as the transferor agrees to be bailee. In actual effect the differences
between the "agreement system!" and the "transfer system" are of much less
practical significance than they appear to be. If these institutions were kept
in mind, many of the difficulties which have plagued the courts, both national and international, as well as the writers-including Dr. Lalive-would
disappear.
American readers will be particularly interested in Dr. Lalive's lucid presentation of the complicated situation which has arisen in the United States
and Canada through the tendency of courts, when determining the title to,
an automobile, to protect conditional sellers and finance companies standing
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in the position of chattel mortgagees. If the car is brought into another state
and sold there, the majority of jurisdictions would refuse to protect the purchaser without inquiring into his good faith vel non. The author does not
seem to like this trend, but he recognizes that it corresponds to the needs of
automobile purchase financing. The extent to which the choice-of-law rules
may at times be shaped by the needs of some particular line of trade would
have been further illustrated by the decisions of the lower courts of Illinois
which, while ordinarily protecting the owner of a chattel which has been
removed from his state without his consent, are inclined to take the opposite
position in the case of cattle. (After all, the stockyards of Chicago are an
important center of the cattle trade in the United States.)
Dr. Lalive's plan required that the problem of the res in transitube sketched
rather than treated in detail. That plan, in all its aspects, has been carried out
with competence and fine understanding. The book, constituting a thesis for
the Ph.D. degree at Cambridge University, has been written from the point of
view of, and with emphasis upon, the private international law of England.
It constitutes, however, a welcome enrichment of the literature of comparative
private international law in general.
MAX RHFXNSTEIN*
* Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.

The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. By John F. Golay.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. ix, 279. $5.00.
After World War II there existed a unique and complicated political situation
in that area of Europe which had formerly been called the German Reich. The
four occupation powers, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia
established separate military governments for each of the geographic quarters
of the Kerngebiet.1 The alliance which had united the four powers during the war
deteriorated rapidly; by 1948 Russia and the three western powers stood in
pointed opposition. The Western powers came to realize that the formal agreements with Moscow were nearly valueless. Certainly after the events in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade it was apparent that Moscow's policy had to
be interpreted as an example of Clausewitz' theory in reverse, that is, that "politics is a continuation of war," the war in this case being the struggle against the
West.
Because the world has in effect shrunk during the last few decades, the political situation in Germany is likely to have a significant impact on Americans,
indeed perhaps a greater impact than the school situation in Little Rock, the
IThe term "Kerngebiet" (literally, kernel of an area) is used because Russia had already
separated a considerable part of the old German Reich (1919-1937) for the benefit of Poland
and had also taken for herself the area around Kbnigsberg in the northeast corner. At the same
time, France kept the Saar region separate from Germany.

